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France’s Marcoule Nuclear Site: A History of 
Transition from Military to Civilian Use
Chieko Kojima
French nuclear research began for military purposes and then further developed 
for business. This article traces the history of French nuclear development from the 
establishment of the French Atomic Energy Commission in 1945 to the present 
by dividing this period into six phases. Contrary to previous studies which focus 
on certain periods, seventy years of French nuclear history is investigated here. It 
describes the transition from military to civilian use, the development of the nuclear 
fuel cycle including the fast breeder reactor, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, and 
disposal research. Additionally, based on a historical case study of the Marcoule site, 
the oldest nuclear site in France, this article shows that France will rely on back-end 
nuclear technology to survive in the twenty-first century. 
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Introduction
As of January 2019, there are 450 operational nuclear power plants around the 
globe with a total capacity of 399,094,000 kW of electricity. Fifty-eight of these 
are in France, a country with a total capacity of 63,130,000 kW, the second 
largest in the world (JAIF 2019). France gets more than 70 percent of its power 
from nuclear sources and hence can be called a major nuclear power. Why did 
France expand the country’s use of nuclear energy? Why dose France continue to 
develop nuclear energy after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident? This article 
aims to investigate the answers to these questions from a historical point of view. 
It is based on not only historical documents but also on study tours to a French 
nuclear site as well as interviews with French nuclear engineers. 
Firstly, a look at the historical development of French nuclear power 
generation is provided. Next, the Marcoule Nuclear Site (“Marcoule”) is used 
as an example and a discussion of its historical role in French nuclear energy 
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development is given. Then, a review based on information gained from visiting 
parts of the facilities at Marcole is made.  
Historical Development of French Nuclear Power Generation 
Phase I: 1945-1950
Before World War II, crucial research that contributed to releasing energy from 
the atomic nucleus was conducted in France. Henri Becquerel (1852-1908) 
discovered radiation in 1896, Marie (1867-1934) and Pierre Curie (1859-1906) 
discovered new radioactive elements in 1898, Frédéric Joliot-Curie (1900-1958) 
and Irène Joliot-Curie (1897-1956) discovered artificial radioactivity in 1934, 
while Frédéric Joliot-Curie, Hans von Halban (1908-1964), and Lew Kowarski 
(1907-1979) proved the potential for a nuclear chain reaction. Furthermore, 
during the war, Halban, Kowarski, and Bertrand Goldschmidt (1912-2002) took 
heavy water from France to Great Britain to work on the development of the 
atomic bomb, then went to Canada as part of the British team participating in the 
Manhattan Project (Goldschmidt 1967, 65-93). 
Although the foundation of nuclear research was set down in France, it 
became difficult for France to develop nuclear energy independently due to the 
devastation suffered under German occupation. Nevertheless, post-war France 
did forge ahead with nuclear energy development.
On October 18, 1945, Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) founded the 
Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (the French Atomic Energy Commission: 
CEA) as a civilian organization to take charge of nuclear energy development. 
The government appointed two people to head the CEA, one responsible for 
administering government finances and another with the authority to lead 
the scientific and technological aspects. The former was the Minister for 
Reconstruction Rauol Dautry (1880-1951), while the latter role was given to 
Frédéric Joliot-Curie. 
Having no technological partnership with Britain or the United States, 
the CEA could not acquire the uranium resources that those countries had 
monopolized. But in 1946, the CEA was able to secure about 10 tons. Most of 
this uranium had been hidden in Morocco by Frédéric Joliot-Curiet during 
World War II, while the remainder was uncovered at Le Havre Station right 
after World War II. At the time, 10 tons of uranium was enough for about three 
years of nuclear research in France (Goldschmidt 1987, 364-365). France also 
preferentially received several tons of heavy water produced in Norwegian 
facilities. 
It was the restrictions imposed by the availability of the materials that 
determined the type of the first French nuclear reactor. Called Zoé (puissance 
zero, oxyde d’uranium et eau lourde), this reactor was different from the nuclear 
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reactors used in America,1 as it used uranium oxide as its fuel, had a very small 
capacity to produce heat, and used heavy water as its neutron moderator.
Initially, the CEA poured most of its efforts into uranium exploration and 
mining. The French Département des Recherches et Exploitations Minières 
(Department of Mineral Resources: DREM) was set up within the CEA to pursue 
the exploration and mining of uranium within France and its overseas territories. 
Then in the fall of 1948, France’s first high-grade uranium ore was discovered 
in Crouzille in south-central France (Lovéreni 1996, 28-29). The lack of fossil 
fuel resources prompted the desire for energy self-sufficiency through domestic 
uranium mining and the discovery at Crouzille was one reason for the continued 
development of nuclear energy in France. 
On December 15 of the same year, Zoé at Châtillon began operations, 
the first successful French nuclear reactor, causing a sensation throughout the 
country. Then in 1949, the national center for nuclear research was set up in 
Saclay, and it was decided to construct a second heavy water reactor after Zoé. 
In November 1948, France successfully separated a few milligrams of plutonium 
at its uranium refinery at Bouchet. The CEA had enjoyed a steady stream of 
achievements since its establishment, and at the end of 1949 it was employing 
some 1,400 people and its budget was increased to 7.3 billion old francs (CEA 
1952, 99, 107).
However, around this time, the behavior of CEA chief Joliot-Curie had 
become a serious problem. The Cold War had intensified, and, as a member 
of the Communist Party, Joliot-Curie had become more politically active and 
had attracted the ire of the French government. Thus, on April 28, 1950, the 
government relieved Joliot-Curie of his duties stating that however brilliant his 
scientific achievements may have been, he was incompatible with his position at 
the CEA due to his support of various resolutions adopted at communist party 
conventions (Goldschmidt 1967, 188). Joliot-Curie’s dismissal had a huge impact 
on the CEA, putting the brakes on the extremely rapid developments that the 
organization had undertaken up to that point, while an increase of members 
to the nuclear energy committee meant that scientific representation on the 
committee was now in the minority.
This first phase can be called an era of scientific leadership under Joliot-
Curie. Having begun as a civilian organization, the CEA scientists were dedicated 
to researching non-military uses of nuclear power. This was a triumphant period 
of success with the first nuclear reactor, the discovery of uranium within France, 
and the extraction of plutonium. 
Phase II: 1951-1960
Although opinions within the government on who should succeed Joliot-Curie 
were divided, Francis Perrin (1901-1992) was entrusted with the job in April 
1951 (CEA 1970, 2). Then in August of the same year, Dautry, the politician 
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who had been responsible for the financial administration of the CEA, suddenly 
died, putting the CEA once again in a potentially dangerous political position. 
However, trouble was circumvented by up-and-coming cabinet politician and 
Minister of State Félix Gaillard (1919-1970), himself an enthusiastic proponent of 
nuclear energy development. Gaillard appointed Pierre Guillaumat (1909-1991), 
an accomplished mining engineer who had specialized in oil problems up to that 
time to succeed Dautry. With the cooperation of Guillaumat, Perrin established 
the first French five-year plan for nuclear energy (Goldschmidt 1967, 192-194). 
This five-year plan was passed by the National Assembly in July of 1952 with a 
budget of 377 billion old francs (Perrin 1953, 111-112). Then in October of the 
same year, EL2, the country’s second heavy water reactor, began operations at 
CEA in Saclay, turning around the stagnant mood in nuclear energy development 
that followed the dismissal of Joliot-Curie into one of progress. 
In August 1955, the first international “Atoms for Peace” conference, which 
was held in Geneva (the Geneva conference), further promoted the development 
of nuclear energy. As the idea was gaining momentum that nuclear energy would 
play a major role in supplementing the energy supplies of the future in France and 
elsewhere, the country established an atomic energy advisory council, Production 
d’Electricite d’Origine Nucleaire (PEON), in the same year.
In January 1956, the French graphite-moderated gas-cooled reactor 
(Uranium Naturel Graphite Gaz:UNGG) G1 began operations at Marcoule. 
Contruction of G1 was carried out by the CEA although it was jointly developed 
by Eléctricité de France (Electricity of France: EDF), after a decision was made 
that that the organization should participate in nuclear energy development from 
1952. The companies S.A.C.M, Alsthom, S.F.A.C., and Rateau also participated 
in the development. Initially EDF’s participation in nuclear energy development 
was carried out under the direction of the CEA; however, EDF later took 
responsibility for overall planning and developed the EDF1 and EDF2 reactors. 
During the Suez Canal Crisis, Britain, France, and Israel sent troops to the 
area in July 1956. Even though the troops were completely withdrawn by 1957, 
the conflict had underscored the importance of nuclear energy and spurred its 
development all over the world (Goldschmidt 1967, 228). At the time, France had 
been enduring the dominance of major international oil companies for the supply 
of crude oil, and the idea that it could avoid dependency on other countries for 
its energy became even stronger. Then in July 1957, the second five-year plan for 
nuclear energy was passed. This time the budget was 500 billion old francs (RFC 
1957, 30), a thirteen fold increase on the budget of the country’s first five-year 
nuclear energy plan.
One of the reasons that the second five-year plan had such an enlarged 
budget was that the CEA had begun military research. Although similar in design 
to the G1 plutonium production reactor, the country’s G2 and G3 reactors also 
included power generation capabilities and began operations in 1958 and 1959 
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respectively. Military research was carried out using plutonium produced by these 
reactors, leading to the first French nuclear weapons test in the Sahara Desert on 
February 13, 1960. 
This second phase was characterized by proactive advancements in nuclear 
energy development as France introduced its five-year nuclear energy plans 
while riding on the global nuclear energy boom. And no longer exclusive to the 
CEA, EDF and private companies had also begun to participate in nuclear energy 
development. Moreover, nuclear energy development had another objective: to 
produce plutonium in reactors for the first French nuclear weapons tests in 1960. 
The CEA’s involvement in military research in this second phase was a complete 
turnaround from the first phase in which CEA was run by Joliot-Curie, a man 
who was opposed to the possession of nuclear weapons (Scheinman 1965, 97). 
Phase III: 1961-1969
During phases I and II, the French development of nuclear energy progressed 
independently in spite of the effects of the worldwide nuclear energy boom and 
the Cold War. However, French nuclear energy policies were influenced by the 
American nuclear industry from the latter half of the 1960s.
From the outset, UNGG type reactors were adopted in France, and the 1964 
PEON report proposed that UNGG development should continue (Morsel 1996, 
719). However, in the United States, Westinghouse had developed its pressurized 
light water reactor (PWR), while General Electric had developed its boiling water 
reactor (BWR). One of the reasons France had not chosen to use PWR or BWR 
light water reactors was because light water reactors used enriched uranium as 
fuel. At the time, enriched uranium refinement was a military secret, and among 
Western countries only the United States had the production technology. So, 
respecting its own autonomy in nuclear energy development, France chose to 
go down the road of developing UNGG reactors using natural uranium as the 
nuclear fuel to avoid reliance on the United States for enriched uranium.
Although the Suez Canal Crisis had alerted the world to the need to 
secure energy supplies including nuclear energy, new crude oil resources were 
subsequently discovered in the Sahara desert, tanker costs fell, and the stance of 
Middle Eastern oil producing countries softened leading to crude oil oversupply 
and a temporary stagnation in nuclear energy development (Goldschmidt 
1984,156). However, the situation changed in 1964 when the economics of nuclear 
energy began to be asserted in developed countries. Data based on operational 
reactors in the United States and Great Britain presented at the third Geneva 
conference held at the end of 1964 showed projections on how reactors started 
up at the end of the 1960s with the capacity to meet demands for electricity in 
large cities would outperform conventional thermal power generation. By the 
end of 1965, confidence in the economics of nuclear energy had spread through 
the American electricity industry, and from 1966 onward the American industry 
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underwent an unprecedented nuclear energy boom, with orders for nuclear 
power facilities reaching 10 billion francs by 1966 (Goldschmidt 1967, 268). At 
the same time, the American nuclear energy industry began proactively selling 
its light water reactors around the world, and received 235 orders in ten years 
starting from the mid-1960s (Debeir, Deléage, and Hémery 1986, 269).
France also found itself caught up in these trends, but they coincided with 
trouble occurring for the first time with an EDF reactor. The EDF1 and EDF2 
UNGG reactors had performed smoothly, however the similar EDF3 reactor 
malfunctioned in October 1966, and then again in March 1968. Thus, a heated 
debate ensued in France in the latter half of the 1960s on whether the country 
should continue using UNGG reactors into the 1970s or build PWR facilities 
(Hecht 1998, 271-323). This battle was said to have been waged between the 
CEA which argued for UNGG reactors and the EDF which preferred PWR 
technologies (Morsel 1996, 721). In the end, PEON selected PWR technology 
(PEON 1968, 57) because globally the most experience was in PWR operation, 
the United States was anticipating cost reductions due to the large number of 
PWR orders, and because there could be some relaxation on enriched uranium, 
over which the United States had a monopoly, since it would be producible in 
Europe with these developments (Goldschmidt 1984, 197). It was not that France 
had had no experience developing PWR. The country had already been involved 
in joint development of the Chooz A1 PWR with Belgium in 1960, while in 
1964 a French-built PWR designed for nuclear submarines began operations. As 
for enriched uranium too, France had begun operations of a military uranium 
enrichment plant at Pierrelatte in 1965, which produced enriched uranium in 
1967. These facts also influenced the decision to shift to PWR.
It was the demise of the dominance of the CEA over nuclear energy 
development and de Gaulle’s support for it that brought an end to UNGG, a 
technology independently developed in France. Georges Pompidou (1911-1974) 
who served as president after de Gaulle in 1969, supported the PWR technology 
selected by EDF and PEON, and thus American technology was eventually 
brought to France.
French nuclear energy development in the 1960s was not just consumed 
by discussions on reactor selection. The country had progressed with fast 
breeder reactor research, and in 1967 began operating its Rapsodie fast breeder 
reactor at Cadarache. France also conducted a megaton-class hydrogen bomb 
test at Fangataufa atoll in 1968, and in 1969 succeeded in the world’s first glass-
solidification high-level waste processing at Marcoule, making the 1960s the era 
of essential technical developments. 
Phase IV: 1970-1990
EDF ordered its first PWR from the United States in 1970. Using both American 
and French capital, Framatome, a company established in 1958, developed PWR 
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construction technology under license from Westinghouse, and held a monopoly 
on PWR construction in France with plans to construct eight billion watts of 
PWR capacity within five years (Bonnet 1982, 123; Framatome 1995, 50). Six 
light water reactors and a European uranium enrichment plant to be built in 
Fessenheim and Bugey were included in the fifth five-year nuclear power plan, 
of which preparations were ongoing in 1970 (Capelle-Blancard 1999, 31). This 
meant that France already had plans on the table to increase production of light 
water reactors right before the first oil shock of 1973.
When this oil shock came, France’s dependency on overseas energy supplies 
was approximately 80 percent, with approximately 60 percent of its primary 
energy dependency being on petroleum. In 1973, France imported 14.5 billion 
francs worth of petroleum from OPEC, a figure which ballooned to 43 billion 
francs the following year. In March 1974, Prime Minister Pierre Messmer (1916-
2007) announced a plan to start building 16,900 MW light water reactors within 
two years to be completed by 1978-1980. Even when Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
(1926-) took over the presidency from Pompidou, policies to drive nuclear power 
were put in place with the Messmer plan being passed in 1975. This momentum 
was further accelerated by the second oil shock of 1978 during which the rush to 
build nuclear power in France continued. By the beginning of the 1980s, there 
were eighteen nuclear power plants operating in France, with a further thirty-
three under construction (ibid., 32-33). In 1973, a mere 8 percent of France’s 
electricity was produced from nuclear power, but by 1990 this had increased to 75 
percent, representing a year-on-year increase of 19.7%. During the same period, 
electric power generation from crude oil dropped from 43 percent to 4 percent, 
which was purely a result of the French government’s push to develop nuclear 
power in response to the oil shocks (Morsel 1996, 683-694).
During the same period, France poured efforts into reprocessing and fast 
breeder reactor research. Since research in these fields had not even progressed 
in the United States, France’s approach was ambitious (Bonnet 1982, 131). The 
Usine Plutonium (UP) 1 reprocessing plant had been operating at Marcoule since 
1958, and research into low and medium level waste processing had begun at La 
Hague in the latter half of the 1960s. High-level waste processing then began at 
La Hague between 1976 and 1977. At the end of 1973, the 250 MW Phoenix fast 
breeder reactor also began operation at Marcoule. Then in 1977, construction of 
the 1.2 GW commercial Super Phoenix began at Creys-Malville, with operations 
commencing in 1985.
New institutions and CEA-affiliated companies were established with this 
diversification of nuclear power development. A nuclear safety and protection 
institute, Institut de Protection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (ISPN), was established 
in 1976 to deal with nuclear safety and environmental issues, while Compagnie 
Générale des Matières Nucléaires (COGEMA) was established to conduct 
uranium exploration and mining, conversion, enrichment, and reprocessing 
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operations etc. In 1979, Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs 
(ANDRA) was established to manage radioactive waste.
This fourth phase was surely the golden era of the French nuclear power 
industry, but criticism was raised of EDF’s extreme nuclear power policies at 
the time of the 1981 presidential and the National Assembly elections, and 
the administration of François Mitterrand (1916-1996) that came to power in 
October of the same year cut back on nuclear power plans to counterbalance the 
fall in energy demand. However, the Mitterrand administration did not change 
the basic policy of promoting nuclear power (Goldschmidt 1984, 280-281). 
Successive administrations in France have always maintained the promotion of 
nuclear energy even after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. 
In May 1986, France established the Commission for Independent Research 
and Information on Radioactivity (Commission de Recherche et d’Information 
Indépendantes sur la Radioactivité: CRIIRAD) centered on scientists who were 
alarmed by the information provided in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. 
This organization was set up as an environmental protection NGO to protect 
citizens from radiation, and monitor radiation pollution from nuclear facilities 
such as those in the Rhone River area and Marcoule. It measures and analyzes 
radiation on requests from local authorities, etc. (JAIA 2016).
Phase V: 1991-2000—Nuclear Power Development Stagnates
Nuclear power development stagnated following the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear 
accident and discussions in the 1990s on banning nuclear testing leading to the 
adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly in September of 1996. There were in fact only three 
countries that embarked on new nuclear development in the 1990s: Mexico 
(1990), China (1994), and Romania (1996). By the 1980s in France, nuclear 
facility projects to cover the country’s electricity demand were completed 
and nuclear reactor orders to Framatome fell dramatically. The proportion of 
electricity generation covered by nuclear plants reached 75 percent in 1990 after 
which it remained unchanged, and EDF stopped new nuclear-related engineer 
recruitments.2
As well as the fall in employment, nuclear development also experienced 
unfavorable conditions. France had been a global leader in fast breeder 
reactor research, but a decision was made to decommission the Superphénix 
demonstration fast breeder reactor, which had reached criticality in 1985. Due 
to a sodium leakage incident and generator accident at Superphénix in 1987 
and 1990, the Socialist Party Prime Minister Lionel Jospin set down a policy to 
decommission the facility in June 1997 to meet a promise made to the Green 
Party. In December 1998, the ordinance to close the facility was announced, and 
work began on December 1, 1999 to remove the fuel from the reactor core. As of 
December 2016, work to dismantle Superphénix and decommission the reactor 
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are ongoing (Guidez 2016, 365-368). In addition to the Superphénix reactor 
decommissioning, the Phénix prototype fast breeder reactor reached its planned 
20-year life-span in 1994, but was extended to 2009 with safety modifications and 
retrofitting.
Also, the Waste Management Act (Bataille’s law) passed in December 1991 
aimed to address the problem of processing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel 
through research on radioactive waste management. Bataille’s law was established 
because the French government decided to establish four deep geological disposal 
research facilities for nuclear waste between 1987 and 1989 without obtaining 
prior community agreement. Those plans were scrapped due to extremely strong 
protests from local residents. After that, Member of Parliament Christian Bataille 
headed investigations which lead to the establishment of Bataille’s law. This law 
applies to management of all of France’s nuclear waste, and addresses potentials 
for deep geological disposal. To guarantee the scientific appraisal under Bataille’s 
law, the National Evaluation Committee (La Commission Nationale d’Evaluation: 
CNE) was set up consisting of specialists completely independent of the French 
Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) and the French National Radioactive Waste 
Management Agency (ANDRA) (COE-INES 2007, 3). In this way, France has 
faced the back-end problem of nuclear waste since 1990. But, for the French 
government, the selection of the final disposal sites proved to be far more difficult 
than imagined.
In addition to deep geological disposal, it was also decided under Bataille’s 
law to research fission and conversion of long-lived radio nucleotides, and long-
term above-ground storage. This research was initially started at the beginning 
of the 1980s at a research facility called Atalante in Fontenay-aux-Roses, but was 
transferred to Marcoule in 1985. Thus, Marcoule was given a new mission as a 
research institute for the long-term storage of left over spent nuclear fuel.
Phase VI: Beyond 2001—The Nuclear Renaissance and the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Plant Accident  
In 2001, the Bush administration in the United States announced proactive 
governmental support for nuclear power generation. Against this backdrop, a 
so-called “nuclear renaissance” was advocated by the American nuclear energy 
industry, and this movement spread to nuclear industries around the globe. The 
nuclear renaissance promoted nuclear power generation due to the necessity 
to reduce consumption of fossil fuels because of their high price and to prevent 
global warming (Yoshioka 2009, 74). In August 2005, the Energy Policy Act 
passed in the United States detailed cooperative support in terms of both finances 
and systems to encourage power companies to build new nuclear power facilities. 
Then, to promote spent nuclear fuel reuse and as a nuclear nonproliferation 
measure, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced a new international 
framework called the “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership” (GNEP) for providing 
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fuel for nuclear power generation to other countries in February 2006. While 
partner countries including Japan, the United Kingdom, and France supply 
fuel for nuclear power generation at a suitable price, this announcement could 
be interpreted as an indication of an American shift towards nuclear fuel 
reprocessing (Denki Shimbun Overseas Nuclear Power Coverage Team 2006, 41-
44).
Boosted by the tail wind of the nuclear renaissance, France strengthened 
its moves into overseas markets. As well as European operations, EDF is also 
involved with seventy-five group companies in a total of twenty-two countries 
in North America, Asia, and Africa, etc. The company has developed power 
generation-related services and consultancies in thirty-five countries, and most 
notably, it pioneered the nuclear power market in China. EDF teamed up with 
the Areva nuclear power group to provide total nuclear power project proposals, 
with EDF providing nuclear power generation operations technology and Areva 
providing hardware and equipment (ibid., 66-69). Areva was established in 
2001 as a company largely owned by the French government, and is a major 
nuclear power corporation formed by grouping COGEMA, which is involved 
with uranium mining and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, and Framatome, 
which manufactures nuclear reactors. Areva is an ambitious exporter of nuclear 
power plants to foreign countries, and its marketing efforts have been backed 
by the French president. In November 2007, President Nicholas Sarkozy visited 
China accompanied by forty CEOs of France’s top companies including Areva, 
and closed an Euro$ 8 billion contract to supply two of the latest PWR plants. 
Additionally, President Sarkozy visited countries such as the UAE, Algeria, 
and Libya to establish cooperative relationships on nuclear power generation 
issues (Yazawa 2008, 88-89). Notably, after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant 
accident in March 2011, President Sarkozy and Areva CEO Anne Lauvergeon 
visited Japan to sell Areva decontamination equipment.3 
Also after the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident, the Socialist party 
leader François Hollande, who was advocating for reducing nuclear power 
generation, was elected by a narrow margin to replace President Sarkozy in 
the May 2012 elections. The “Energy Transition Law” was enacted under his 
administration in July 2015. This law involves expanded implementation of 
renewable energy, promotion of energy savings, a reduction in the share of 
nuclear power generation from 75 percent to 50 percent by 2025, and shutting 
down Fessenheim, the oldest nuclear power station in France, pledges made 
by President Hollande during his election campaign. However, Fessenheim 
was not shut down before Hollande finished his term as president, and future 
nuclear policy hinged on the results of the April-May 2017 French Presidential 
Election from which Hollande withdrew his candidacy. Although the French 
government began to show a proactive stance toward renewable energy in the 
twenty-first century,4 considering the history of nuclear power development 
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in France, its policy appears to advocate a continuation of its expansion in the 
international nuclear power markets having earned trust for safety both in France 
and internationally. This implies a strategy of exporting nuclear power plants to 
countries newly developing nuclear power, and providing back-end technologies 
to existing nuclear countries like Japan and those in Europe.
French citizens have been surveyed regarding nuclear power by the French 
Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy. To the question 
“Three quarters of France’s electricity comes from nuclear power. Considering all 
aspects, are you in favor or against nuclear power?” polled in July 2011, right after 
the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the number of those against quickly rose to 50 
percent; although by January 2012, the number of those in favor had risen to 47 
percent. In ten years, the percentage those in favor of nuclear energy have moved 
between the high forties and low fifties, and it appears that the psychological 
influence of the Fukushima Daiichi accident was temporary (Onishi 2013, 
14). Nevertheless, the major impact of the Fukushima Daiichi accident on the 
opinions of the French people remains unchanged. Although French nuclear 
power plants operating since the 1970s and 1980s are slated for replacement in 
the 2020s, the biggest issue for French nuclear power policy in this regard is how 
to respond to the French citizenry.
The History of the Marcoule Site
The previous section outlined the history of French nuclear power generation 
development and described plutonium manufactured at Marcoule and used 
in France’s first nuclear weapon test, UP1, the first French spent nuclear fuel 
reprocessing plant set up at Marcoule, the Phénix prototype fast breeder reactor 
that operated at Marcoule, and Atalante, a facility for researching spent nuclear 
fuel reprocessing and disposal which was transferred to Marcoule.
Marcoule started out as a military research facility, but later became a facility 
for civilian purposes promoting the nuclear fuel cycle and fast breeder reactor 
development, and was active in spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and disposal 
research. Thus, Marcoule is a microcosm that illustrates the history of nuclear 
power development in France.
This section discusses the history of nuclear development at Marcoule in 
three stages. Firstly, the plutonium production and reprocessing plant for military 
purposes. Secondly, the Phénix fast breeder reactor, and finally spent nuclear fuel 
reprocessing, disposal research, and reactor decommissioning measures. The 
following section reports on the Atalante laboratory researching spent nuclear 
fuel reprocessing and disposal and the decommissioning of the Phénix prototype 
fast breeder reactor.
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Military Plutonium Production and Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant
The Beginning of Military Research: In April 1950, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, who 
was opposed to nuclear weapon development, was dismissed as the head of 
the CEA Science Department, after which the CEA began developing nuclear 
power for military purposes. Many scientists, including Frédéric Joliot-Curie’s 
replacement as the head of the CEA Science Department Francis Perrin, 
advocated the use of nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes; although later, 
Yves Rocard, who played a central role in the development of France’s nuclear 
weapons, said that the military use of nuclear power was in the national interest 
(Scheinman 1965, 123-124). The French Minister of State Félix Gaillard said “for 
France to become a modern nation, it is up to us” (CEA 1996, 52), and asserted 
that “the use of nuclear power will determine the future of France” (Hecht 1998, 
60). As a result, a budget of 37.7 billion old Francs was approved for the first five-
year plan for nuclear power in July 1952 for plutonium production and power 
generation research, and a target was set to produce 50 kg of plutonium annually 
for both public and military purposes. This five-year plan aimed to build three 
reactors, two of which were the G1 and G2 graphite-moderated gas reactors for 
producing plutonium, construction of which was supervised by Pierre Taranger 
who graduated from École Polytechnique (Mazzucchetti 2005, 6).
The Marcoule Site Decision: The G series reactors for producing plutonium, 
G1, G2, and G3, required a site with an abundant supply of water for the nuclear 
fuel reprocessing plant extracting the plutonium from the nuclear fuel used in 
those reactors. Hence, the Rhone River basin was considered for candidate sites. 
Marcoule was suitable because it is also in an area where the Mistral wind blows. 
Requirements also included solid ground and height to escape flooding. G1 
construction director Taranger himself inspected the site, and in December 1952 
the Marcoule site was formally selected (see Figure 1).
After construction began in January 1953, seventy-seven grape growers 
submitted a declaration protesting the construction in February. One of those 
opposed, Louis Anglezan, protested saying that “building a nuclear power facility 
only eight years after the Hiroshima bombing is unforgivable” (Mazzuccheri 
2005, 13). However, in April 1953, the CEA-issued land acquisition ordinance 
came into effect, the agency won its cases in July and October of the same year at 
the Uzès District Court, but a settlement was reached to guarantee the rights of 
the viticulturists. Former soldier Robert Colson was instrumental in promoting 
the land. Colson had married a famous Marcoule local and had been living 
there since 1952, and owned a lot of the land. In June 1953, Colson became a 
director of preparing for the construction of the plutonium production facility at 
Marcoule and was a hugely influential figure during that period (ibid., 15).
Construction of the Plutonium Production Facility: In May 1955, the 1952 
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first nuclear power five-year plan was amended; a budget was received from the 
French ministry to construct the G3 plutonium production reactor and acquire 
plutonium for military purposes through reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from 
that reactor. Then in October 1955, the plutonium production facility at Marcoule 
opened and Maurice Gervais de Rouville from the École Polytechnique assumed 
its directorship.
The CEA adopted a method of assigning each department with one company 
designated with a task and then integrating them to proceed with work. For 
example, the Schneider group subsidiaries such as SFAC and SACM for nuclear 
fuel, Alsthom for control and power equipment, La CITRA for concrete, and 
Saint-Gobain for radioactive waste deposit were adopted for the G1 reactor. 
As a result of these companies using other companies, there was a total of 350 
companies involved in the construction of the plutonium production facility. 
These partnerships were reformed during construction of later French nuclear 
power plants—Chinon, Saint-Laurent, and Bugey—but they were originally 
formed around the Marcoule project.
The CEA and these companies proceeded with construction at breakneck 
speed. Generally there are delays in construction, but thanks to simultaneously 
driving research, parts production, and construction, the G1 project reached 
criticality in January 1956 after construction commenced in May 1954, having 
only experienced six days of delays. Construction of G2 began in September 1955, 
although detailed planning was not finalized until February 1956. G2 reached 
criticality in July 1958, and G3 reached criticality in June 1959. Guy Richard, 
Figure 1. Current Nuclear Power Facilities in France




director of SACM, one of the companies involved in construction, described the 
conditions at the time as “twelve hours a day of labor from Monday to Saturday, 
and sometimes on Sunday as well. It was as if we were in a procurement boom 
preparing for war, with no limit to our budget. Essentially, we just completed the 
plan in a short period of time without the company really knowing how much 
cost was involved.” Figure 2 shows CEA equipment being carried to Marcoule on 
February 26, 1957. This long train of trucks was dubbed the “nuclear centipede” 
(Mazzucchetti 2005, 14-17).
The most difficult aspect of developing the graphite-moderated gas reactor 
was plutonium extraction. France had first experimentally extracted several 
milligrams of plutonium in November 1949. From 1952, Bertrand Goldschmidt 
and Pierre Regnaut worked on plutonium extraction research, and in 1953 an 
experimental plutonium factory was built at Châtillon. However, that research 
was taken over by UP1, which began operating at Marcoule in July 1958 as 
France’s first spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.
The first time spent nuclear fuel from G1 was brought to UP1 was in July 
1958, and following from that the first plutonium ingot was produced in February 
1959. France performed its first nuclear weapon test on February 13, 1960 in the 
Sahara using plutonium extracted from spent G1 nuclear fuel reprocessed at UP1. 
Without this plutonium production facility at Marcoule, France’s first nuclear test 
would not have been possible.
The Decline of the Marcoule Site: The Marcoule plutonium production facility 
played a central role in the first French nuclear weapon test, and was a pioneer 
with its graphite-moderated gas reactor and reprocessing plant development. 
After the successful 1960 test, the Marcoule site began reprocessing spent nuclear 
fuel from the Chinon nuclear reactor run by EDF for civilian purposes in 1964 
Figure 2. “The Nuclear Centipede”
Source: Le Midi Libre (1957)
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(CEA 1964, 32), and produced 1,000 to 1,200 g plutonium ingots in 1965 (CEA 
1970, 30).
With debate about the types of nuclear reactors in the latter half of the 1960s, 
the Marcoule site began to decline. From the 1970s onwards, the CEA asserted 
that graphite-moderated gas cooled reactors should be selected while EDF 
insisted on light water reactors. While the debate on reactor types progressed, the 
number of staff at the G1 graphite gas cooled reactor used for nuclear weapons 
testing was reduced from eighty-two to fifty-seven people, and in October 
1968 G1 was decommissioned. The debate ended with France adopting light 
water reactors in 1969, and UP1, which was a reprocessing plant for graphite-
moderated gas reactors, was hit hard by the decision.
This decision also entailed nuclear power facilities construction in other 
districts, which caused the presence of Marcoule to gradually fade. In 1960, 
construction on France’s second reprocessing plant UP2 began in La Hague 
and commenced operation in 1967. After UP2 started running, spent nuclear 
fuel from EDF’s Chinon reactor, which had been processed at UP1 at Marcoule, 
shifted to processing at La Hague. In 1961, a uranium conversion plant began 
operating at Pierrelatt, and in 1962 plutonium production for nuclear fuel began 
at Cadarache for Rapsodie, France’s first fast breeder reactor. As a result, the 200 
jobs that existed up to 1971 and the 300 to 400 jobs that existed between 1971 
and 1975 at the Marcoule site were abolished, and many talented engineers were 
transferred to other sites. Marcoule’s first director, Maurice Gervais de Rouville, 
called this period the “dark age” of Marcoule. Job losses at Marcoule resulted in 
demonstrations and strikes. In 1968 in particular on the tenth anniversary of 
UP1’s first reprocessing, between 500 and 600 laborers demonstrated to protest 
against the top-down methods of the CEA and demand lower working hours, 
safety standards, and a retirement system. Then in December 1968, Gervais de 
Rouville resigned his directorship after serving for thirteen years since 1955 
(Mazzucchetti 2005, 77-81).
The Phénix Fast Breeder Reactor
The Molbert Revolution: In December 1968, Gervais de Rouville’s successor 
Michel Molbert arrived at Marcoule and began serving as director. Forty-year-old 
Molbert, former student of the Ecole Polytechnique, ran the Marcoule site with 
completely different methods than his predecessor. While following the policies 
of the CEA, Molbert was always willing to engage in conversations with the 
Marcoule staff and thus established a penetrative system of cooperation. In this 
way, Molbert took up the challenge of running a new organization and made an 
effort to acquire new customers beyond the French Defense Ministry and EDF by 
providing results of the research done at Marcoule to a wide range of industries 
involved in information processing, physical chemistry, and medicine (ibid., 83-
93).
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Also, maintaining a pioneering position, Molbert oversaw the construction 
of the Phénix prototype fast breeder reactor at Marcoule. Phénix construction 
began in 1968 and reached criticality in 1973, a period which overlapped with 
Molbert’s tenure as director.
The History of the Phénix Development: Fast breeder reactor research began in 
France due to its close relationship with the G1 reactor constructed at Marcoule. 
According to Georges Vendryes (1997, 27), the so-called father of the fast breeder 
reactor, this research was conducted at Saclay by the physicists and engineers who 
had built the G1 reactor that reached criticality at Marcoule in 1956. Vendryes 
stated in an interview that he was involved in researching neutrons at G1, but the 
research group disbanded after the success of G1 and the same group members 
began researching fast breeder reactors (Kojima 2011, 65-86). During the G1 
development, it was impossible to acquire enriched uranium in France and the 
French government did not want to rely on the United States for its nuclear fuel. 
So the G1 nuclear fuel was natural uranium. Because the purpose of the G1 was 
to produce plutonium, the shift to fast breeder research to acquire plutonium by 
high-speed neutron absorption in uranium 238 was a logical step following the 
G1 research. The construction of the Rapsodie fast breeder test reactor began in 
1962 and reached criticality in January 1967 at Cadarache.
At Marcoule, the Phénix prototype fast breeder reactor construction 
began in 1968 and went critical in August 1973. At the time, Phénix was a fast 
breeder reactor operating stably at full power (Ferrair, Sugier, and Vautrey 1979, 
586). In fact, Rémy Carle, who was in charge of planning Phénix, stated in an 
interview that he felt that with the success of Phénix, France was at the top of 
fast breeder reactor research (Kojima 2009, 1-39). In the United States, which 
had led fast breeder reactor research, research had stalled in the last half of the 
1970s. Although France was a late starter, it began research with the Superphénix 
demonstration fast breeder reactor in the early 1970s. Carle’s statement can be 
interpreted as an assertion that although France imported light water reactors 
from the United States, it had in fact beaten the United States with its fast breeder 
reactors which demanded higher levels of technology.
Phénix, which had been operating since 1974, was the only prototype fast 
breeder reactor in operation for thirty-five years even though it had experienced 
various incidents such as leakage of sodium coolant (Guidez 2013, 211-219). It 
was formally recognized by the American Atomic Energy Society as a nuclear 
historic landmark in FY 1997 (Sauvage 2009, 137). The Phénix prototype fast 
breeder reactor reached its planned twenty-year lifespan in 1994, but was 
extended with the decommissioning of the Superphénix demonstration fast 
breeder reactor. Superphénix reached criticality in Creys-Malville in September 
1985, but due to incidents such as sodium leakages in 1987 and 1990 and a 
generator incident, the plant was slated for decommissioning in June 1997, and an 
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ordinance to close the plant was announced in December 1998. Thus, the Phénix 
fast breeder reactor underwent safety modifications and retrofitting to extend 
its lifespan to 2009. When Phénix resumed operations in 2003, experiments 
were performed mainly on nuclear transmutation of minor actinoids and long-
life radioactive wastes and irradiation for development of future gas-cooled 
fast breeder reactors. In other words, the experiments essentially planned for 
Superphénix were taken over by Phénix.5
After operations were halted in 2009, the spent fuel and sodium were 
removed from Phénix and sodium processing and other facilities were set up. The 
subsequent decommissioning is described as a case study below.
Spent Nuclear Fuel Processing, Disposal Research, and Decommissioning Equipment
Spent Nuclear Fuel Processing and Disposal Research: Nuclear power 
development stagnated globally in the 1990s following the April 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear accident and discussions in the 1990s on banning nuclear testing leading 
to the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the UN 
General Assembly in September of 1996. In France also, the necessity to build 
new nuclear power stations disappeared, and employment in the sector fell. 
However, it was also a period in which new back-end nuclear businesses began 
to flourish. Bataille’s law passed in December 1991 aimed to address the problem 
of processing and disposing of spent nuclear fuel through research on radioactive 
waste management. In addition to deep geological disposal, it was also decided 
to research fission and conversion of long-lived radio nucleotides and long-term 
above-ground storage. The studies began in the early 1980s at a research facility 
called Atalante in the Parisian suburb of Fontenay-aux-Roses, but Atalante was 
transferred to Marcoule between 1985 and 1992. Thus, Marcoule took over the 
job of researching the processing, disposal, and long-term storage of spent nuclear 
fuel left over from the past. The first spent nuclear fuel arrived in 1999, and in 
2005 the LN1 facility was constructed mainly to study the chemical and physical 
chemistry of transuranic elements, while the DELOS facility began operations in 
2008 to study the mineralization of liquid organic pollutants. Atalante currently 
consists of five buildings. Thus, as the world’s leading research facility specializing 
in spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, disposal, and long-term storage, the American 
Nuclear Society formally recognized these facilities as nuclear historic buildings 
in 2013 (American Nuclear Society 2019).
Case Study of Atalante: This section provides a review based on information 
gained while visiting part of the Atalante facility at Marcoule in March 2015. 
Photography was forbidden, therefore photographs have been borrowed from 
the Revue générale nucléaire, the magazine of the Société Française d’Energie 
Nucléaire (SFEN - French Nuclear Society).
Atalante is an indispensable facility in France, a country which chose the 
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nuclear fuel cycle, and is at the cutting edge of nuclear fuel reprocessing research. 
With five buildings on a 25,000 m2 campus, each of the buildings handles a 
stage of the nuclear fuel cycle—dissolution of the nuclear material from spent 
nuclear fuel, purification of nuclear material, conversion to powdered nuclear 
materials that can be reused, manufacture of new MOX-type nuclear fuel using 
that powder, and research on vitrified glass to contain nuclear waste after final 
processing. There are two hundred people such as engineers and researchers 
directing experiments and seventy safety officers employed at Atalante.
Atalante has four research policies. First, supplying technologies to Areva 
to optimize operations of the reprocessing plant at La Hague and the Melox 
MOX fuel plant at Marcoule. In fact, the description of the Atalante facility states 
that “Marcoule is the mother of La Hague” and emphasizes that the technical 
problems that arise at La Hague are analyzed at Marcoule, the results of which are 
fed back to La Hague. Second, bringing greater efficiency to the nuclear fuel cycle, 
miniaturization of plutonium extraction facilities, and a reduction of chemical 
waste in preparation for future fast breeder reactors. Third, the nuclear conversion 
of minor actinoids. Because long half-life minor actinoids, such as neptunium, 
americium, and curium, are found in high level radioactive waste, this research 
aims to convert long-lived dangerous radionuclides to non-radioactive or short-
lived nuclides. Fourth, physical chemistry research on glass vitrification of long-
lived radioactive waste. 
Special equipment is always required to mitigate the danger of exposure to 
radiation during experimental work, typically glove boxes (Figure 3). Radioactive 
substances are kept in these transparent hermetically sealed boxes to prevent 
exposure to the outside air, and the gloves are directly attached to the boxes, 
which enables work isolated from the outside air by utilizing the gloves. There are 
Figure 3. Glove Boxes
Source: SFEN (2016)
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two hundred fifty such glove boxes at Atalante.
Substances that emit strong radiation such as gamma rays cannot be handled 
in a glove box and work must be done via remotely controlled equipment with 
the radioactive substance in a space surrounded by thick concrete or lead walls 
while researchers look on through a peephole. Atalante has eleven rooms with 
this remotely controlled equipment covering fifty-nine categories.
Reactor Decommissioning Measures: Decommissioning of the military-purpose 
reactors built at Marcoule was fixed for 1969 for G1, 1980 for G2, and 1984 for 
G3. The prototype fast breeder reactor Phénix also ceased operations in 2009 and 
is currently undergoing decommissioning. France’s first reprocessing plant UP1 
ceased operations in 1997 and is also currently being decommissioned. Looking 
at the map of the Marcoule site reveals extensive decommissioning work (Figure 
4). Built originally for military nuclear purposes, the Marcoule site has become a 
center for research on the stabilization of civilian-use reactors in their final stages, 
reactor decommissioning, and reprocessing plant decommissioning.
Case Study of Phénix: As a case study of reactor decommissioning measures 
at Marcoule, this section provides a review based of the state of Phénix 
decommissioning based on information gained on a visit to Marcoule in March 
Figure 4. Site Map of Marcoule
Note:  The G1 building is in the center, G2 and G3 are at the lower right, Phénix is in the upper 
right, and UP1 is at the center right. The Rhone River flows on the right.
Source: HCTISN (2014)
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2015. The photographs included are those that were permitted during the visit.
The CEA has planned the decommissioning of Phénix in six stages (Collet 
2016). The first stage involves removing the nuclear fuel from the reactor core, 
removing the neutron moderation equipment, and removing the removable 
parts of the reactor core. Completion of nuclear fuel removal is targeted for 
2025, while removal of other equipment is targeted for 2031. The second stage 
involves dismantling the secondary systems by 2025, while the third stage 
involves removal of the sodium coolant and sodium-contaminated metal by 
2037. The fourth stage involves processing the sodium remaining in the tanks by 
2039, while the fifth stage involves disassembly of the reactor core and primary 
systems by 2043. The final sixth stage involves decontaminating the building 
and soil by 2050. The initial plan was to decommission Phénix by 2030, but then 
an ordinance was issued on June 5, 2016 for complete disassembly by 2045. It is 
expected that there will be delays in the Phénix decommissioning plan.
The author visited the generator section, the non-operating reactor section, 
and the reactor control room in March 2015. The steam generator of the 
generator section still remained (Figure 5), but the turbine has been completely 
removed to be reused at another power station. The reactor control room is still 
the same as it was during operations (Figure 6). At the peak of its operations, 
there were about three hundred people working at Phénix including engineers, 
administrators, and about thirty researchers involved in nuclear physics.
The Phénix decommissioning is not just a matter of destroying the 
existing reactor. New facilities have been built at Marcoule for the Phénix 
decommissioning. One of these facilities is required for stable processing of the 
recovered sodium. Using a so-called NOAH method, radioactive sodium-22 is 
Figure 5. Phénix Steam Generator Section 
Source: Photographed by the author on March 13, 2015
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stored until it reduces to sodium chloride (NaCl) and is then discarded. Another 
facility is storage for sodium-contaminated metal parts and so forth. Differing 
from light water reactors that use water as the coolant, fast breeder reactors use 
sodium coolant which becomes radioactive, and hence require these special 
facilities when they are decommissioned. In 2016, the Japanese prototype fast 
breeder reactor Monju was slated for decommissioning and is not hard to 
imagine that France will offer its Phénix decommissioning technology to Japan.
Conclusion
In light of the historical development of French nuclear power generation, this 
article has described the history of the Marcoule Site, a nuclear facility which 
shifted from military to civilian usage, and which illustrates French nuclear 
policy as a microcosm. The site started out as a military research facility, and then 
advanced the nuclear fuel cycle and fast breeder reactor development as a civilian 
research facility. After nuclear power generation developments stagnated, the 
facility has focused on researching spent nuclear fuel processing and disposal, as 
well as plant decommissioning measures. The history of the Marcoule Site shows 
us the past, present, and future of French nuclear energy development.  
Since Monju, a Japanese fast breeder reactor, was slated for decommissioning 
in 2016, participating in the Advanced Sodium Technological Reactor for 
Industrial Demonstration (ASTRID), a French fast breeder research facility 
planned for construction at Marcoule, is under consideration in Japan. In the 
past, joint Japanese-French research has also been conducted at Marcoule and 
Figure 6. Phénix Control Room
Source: Photographed by the author on March 13, 2015
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there is a high possibility that Japan will join the ASTRID plan.   
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Notes
1.  Chicago Pile-1 (CP-1), the world’s first nuclear reactor, succeeded at the University of 
Chicago on December 2, 1942 and it used graphite to serve as moderators.  
2.  Information from an interview by the author with Laurant Turpin, director of the 
CEA affiliated Institut national des sciences et techniques nucléaires (INSTN) on October 2, 
2009.
3.  Areva decontamination equipment for high-level radioactive waste water treatment 
costing JPY$ 6 billion deployed at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi 
plant was not used after September 2011 (Asahi Shimbum 2011). 
4.  On March 3, 2010, the CEA changed its name for the first time since its 1945 
establishment, from Commissariat à l’énergie atomique to Commissariat à l’énergie 
atomique et aux énergies alternatives (Areva Activité 2013). 
5.  The author interviewed Joël Guidez on November 2, 2015, who was the Phénix 
director from 2002 to 2008, during preparations to recommence operations and after they 
recommenced. He stated that due to the decommissioning of Superphénix, its associated 
research activities were carried over to Phénix after its operations recommenced.
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